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Abstract We study the utility maximization problem for power utility random fields in a
semimartingale financial market, with and without intermediate consumption. The notion of
an opportunity process is introduced as a reduced form of the value process of the result-
ing stochastic control problem. We show how the opportunity process describes the key
objects: optimal strategy, value function, and dual problem. The results are applied to obtain
monotonicity properties of the optimal consumption.
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1 Introduction
We consider the utility maximization problem in a semimartingale model for a financial mar-
ket, with and without intermediate consumption. While the model is general, we focus on
power utilities. If the maximization is seen as a stochastic control problem, the homogeneity
of these utilities leads to a factorization of the value process into a power of the current wealth
and a process L around which our analysis is built. This corresponds to the usual factorization
of the value function in a Markovian setting. The process L is called opportunity process as
Lt encodes the conditional expected utility that can be attained from time t . This name was
introduced by ˇCerný and Kallsen [1] in the context of mean-variance hedging for an object
that is analogous, although introduced in a different way by those authors. Surprisingly, there
exists no general study of L for the case of power utility, which is a gap we try to fill here.
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The opportunity process is a suitable tool to derive qualitative results about the opti-
mal consumption strategy. Indeed, we first establish the connection between L and the
solution ̂Y of the convex-dual problem. Since ̂Y is related to the optimal consump-
tion by the marginal utility, this leads to a feedback formula for the optimal consump-
tion in terms of L for general semimartingale models. Previous results in this direc-
tion (see Stoikov and Zariphopoulou [25]) required a Markovian model and the veri-
fication of a solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Via the feedback for-
mula, seemingly abstract results about the opportunity process translate to properties of
the optimal consumption which are of direct economic interest. In particular, we derive
monotonicity properties and bounds that are quite explicit despite the generality of the
model.
The present paper combines tools from convex duality and dynamic programming to
study the utility maximization problem from a “global” point of view. The study of the
local structure requires a more computational approach presented in a companion paper [21]
and yields, in particular, a formula for the optimal trading strategy in terms of the oppor-
tunity process. That formula cannot be obtained by the abstract arguments of the present
paper. However, its derivation requires the structures that we introduce here, and there-
fore some details in our exposition are motivated by the requirements of the companion
paper.
This paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, we discuss power utility random
fields and specify the optimization problem in detail. Section 3 introduces the opportunity
process L via dynamic programming and examines its basic properties. Section 4 relates L
to convex duality theory and reverse Hölder inequalities, which is useful to obtain bounds
for the opportunity process. Section 5 contains the feedback formula and the applications to
the study of the optimal consumption. Section 6 completes the picture by a brief description
of the formula for the optimal trading strategy. Two appendices supply the necessary results
about dynamic programming and duality theory.
We refer to Jacod and Shiryaev [9] for unexplained notation.
2 The optimization problem
2.1 Financial market
We fix the time horizon T ∈ (0,∞) and a filtered probability space (,F, (Ft )t∈[0,T ], P) sat-
isfying the usual assumptions of right-continuity and completeness, as well as F0 = {∅,}P-
a.s. We consider an Rd -valued càdlàg semimartingale R with R0 = 0. The (componentwise)
stochastic exponential S = E(R) represents the discounted price processes of d risky assets,
while R stands for their returns. Our agent also has a bank account paying zero interest at
his disposal.
2.2 Trading strategies and consumption
The agent is endowed with a deterministic initial capital x0 > 0. A trading strategy is a
predictable R-integrable Rd -valued process π , where the i th component is interpreted as the
fraction of wealth (or the portfolio proportion) invested in the i th risky asset. A consump-
tion strategy is a nonnegative optional process c such that
∫ T
0 ct dt < ∞ P-a.s. We want
to consider two cases. Either consumption occurs only at the terminal time T (utility from
“terminal wealth” only); or there is intermediate consumption plus a bulk consumption at
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the time horizon. To unify the notation, we define the measure μ on [0, T ] by
μ(dt) :=
{
0 in the case without intermediate consumption,
dt in the case with intermediate consumption.
We also define μ◦ := μ + δ{T }, where δ{T } is the unit Dirac measure at T . The wealth
process X (π, c) corresponding to a pair (π, c) is described by the linear equation
Xt (π, c) = x0 +
t
∫
0
Xs−(π, c)πs d Rs −
t
∫
0
cs μ(ds), 0 ≤ t ≤ T (2.1)
and the set of admissible trading and consumption pairs is
A (x0) = {(π, c) : X (π, c) > 0, X−(π, c) > 0 and cT = XT (π, c)} .
The convention cT = XT (π, c) means that all the remaining wealth is consumed at time T ;
it is merely for notational convenience. Indeed, X (π, c) does not depend on cT , hence any
given consumption strategy c can be redefined to satisfy cT = XT (π, c). We fix the initial
capital x0 and usually write A for A (x0). A consumption strategy c is called admissible if
there exists π such that (π, c) ∈ A ; we write c ∈ A for brevity. The meaning of π ∈ A is
analogous.
Sometimes it is convenient to parametrize the consumption strategies as fractions of
wealth. Let (π, c) ∈ A and let X = X (π, c) be the corresponding wealth process. Then
κ := c
X
(2.2)
is called the propensity to consume corresponding to (π, c). Note that κT = 1 due to our
convention that cT = XT .
Remark 2.1 (i) The parametrization (π, κ) allows to express wealth processes as stochas-
tic exponentials: by (2.1),
X (π, κ) = x0E (π • R − κ • μ) (2.3)
coincides with X (π, c) for κ := c/X (π, c), where we have used that the càdlàg prop-
erty implies X (π, c) = X (π, c)− μ-a.e. Note that the symbol • indicates an integral,
e.g., π • R = ∫ πs d Rs .
(ii) The relation (2.2) induces a one-to-one correspondence between the pairs (π, c) ∈ A
and the pairs (π, κ) such that π ∈ A and κ is a nonnegative optional process satis-
fying
∫ T
0 κs ds < ∞ P-a.s. and κT = 1. Indeed, given (π, c) ∈ A , define κ by (2.2)
with X = X (π, c). As X, X− > 0 and as X is càdlàg, almost every path of X is
bounded away from zero and κ has the desired integrability. Conversely, given (π, κ),
define X via (2.3) and c := κ X ; then X = X (π, c). From admissibility we deduce
πR > −1 up to evanescence, which in turn shows X > 0. Now X− > 0 by a
standard property of stochastic exponentials [9, II.8a], so (π, c) ∈ A .
2.3 Preferences
Fix p ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1) and let D be a càdlàg adapted strictly positive process such that
E
[
∫ T
0 Ds μ
◦(ds)
]
< ∞. We define the utility random field
Ut (x) := Dt 1p x p, x ∈ [0,∞), t ∈ [0, T ],
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where 1/0 := ∞. We remark that Zariphopoulou [27] and Tehranchi [26] have previously
used utility functions modified by certain multiplicative random variables, in the case where
utility is obtained from terminal wealth. To wit, Ut (x) is any p-homogeneous utility random
field such that a constant consumption yields finite expected utility, and therefore the most
general utility random field that gives rise to the structure studied in this paper. In particu-
lar, our results do not apply to the additive specification U ′t (x) := 1p (x + Dt )p that would
correspond to a hedging or random endowment problem, except of course for trivial choices
of D.
In the sequel, we will sometimes assume that there are constants k1 and k2 such that
0 < k1 ≤ Dt ≤ k2, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.4)
The expected utility corresponding to a consumption strategy c ∈ A is given by
E[∫ T0 Ut (ct ) μ◦(dt)]. Recall that this is either E[UT (cT )] or E[
∫ T
0 Ut (ct ) dt + UT (cT )].
In the case without intermediate consumption, Ut is irrelevant for t < T .
Remark 2.2 The process D can be used for discounting utility and consumption, or to deter-
mine the weight of intermediate consumption compared to terminal wealth. Our utility func-
tional can also be related to the usual power utility function 1p x
p in the following ways. If
we write
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
0
Ut (ct ) μ◦(dt)
⎤
⎦ = E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
0
1
p c
p
t d Kt
⎤
⎦
for d Kt := Dt μ◦(dt), we have the usual power utility, but with a stochastic clock K (cf.
Goll and Kallsen [7]). In fact, one could also consider more general measures d K and obtain
a structure similar to our results below.
To model taxation of the consumption, let  > −1 be the tax rate and define D :=
(1+)−p . If c represents the cashflow out of the portfolio, c/(1+) is the effectively obtained
amount of the consumption good, yielding the instantaneous utility 1p (ct/(1+t ))p = Ut (ct ).
Similarly, DT can model a multiplicative bonus payment.
For yet another alternative, assume either that there is no intermediate consumption or
that D is a martingale, and that E[DT ] = 1. Then
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
0
Ut (ct ) μ◦(dt)
⎤
⎦ = E ˜P
⎡
⎣
T
∫
0
1
p c
p
t μ
◦(dt)
⎤
⎦
with the equivalent probability ˜P defined by d ˜P = DT d P . This is the standard power
utility problem for an agent with subjective beliefs, i.e., who uses ˜P instead of the objective
probability P .
We assume that the value of the utility maximization problem is finite, i.e.,
u(x0) := sup
c∈A (x0)
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
0
Ut (ct ) μ◦(dt)
⎤
⎦ < ∞. (2.5)
This is a standing assumption for the entire paper. It is void if p < 0 because then U < 0.
If p > 0, it needs to be checked on a case-by-case basis (see also Remark 4.7). A strat-
egy (πˆ, cˆ) ∈ A (x0) is optimal if E
[
∫ T
0 Ut (ct ) μ
◦(dt)
]
= u(x0). Of course, a no-arbitrage
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property is required to guarantee its existence. Let M S be the set of equivalent σ -martingale
measures for S. If
M S 
= ∅, (2.6)
arbitrage is excluded in the sense of the NFLVR condition (cf. Delbaen and Schacherma-
yer [3]). We can cite the following existence result of Karatzas and Žitkovic´ [12]; it was
previously obtained by Kramkov and Schachermayer [15] for the case without intermediate
consumption.
Proposition 2.3 Under (2.4) and (2.6), there exists an optimal strategy (πˆ , cˆ) ∈ A . The
corresponding wealth process ̂X = X (πˆ, cˆ) is unique. The consumption strategy cˆ can be
chosen to be càdlàg and is unique P ⊗ μ◦-a.e.
In the sequel, cˆ denotes a càdlàg version. We note that under (2.6), the requirement
X (π, c)− > 0 in the definition of A is automatically satisfied as soon as X (π, c) > 0,
because X (π, c) is then a positive supermartingale under an equivalent measure.
Remark 2.4 In Proposition 2.3, the assumption on D can be weakened by exploiting that
(2.6) is invariant under equivalent changes of measure. Suppose that D = D′D′′, where D′
meets (2.4) and D′′ is a martingale with unit expectation. As in Remark 2.2, we consider the
problem under the probability d ˜P = D′′T d P , then Proposition 2.3 applies under ˜P with D′
instead of D, and we obtain the existence of a solution also under P .
3 The opportunity process
This section introduces the main object under discussion. We do not yet impose the exis-
tence of an optimal strategy, but recall the standing assumption (2.5). To apply dynamic
programming, we introduce for each (π, c) ∈ A and t ∈ [0, T ] the set
A (π, c, t) = {(π˜, c˜) ∈ A : (π˜ , c˜) = (π, c) on [0, t]}. (3.1)
These are the controls available on (t, T ] after having used (π, c) until t . For brevity, we
write c˜ ∈ A (π, c, t) if there exists π˜ such that (π˜ , c˜) ∈ A (π, c, t). Given (π, c) ∈ A , we
consider the value process
Jt (π, c) := ess sup
c˜∈A (π,c,t)
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
Us(c˜s) μ◦(ds) |Ft
⎤
⎦ . (3.2)
We choose the càdlàg version of this process (see Proposition 7.2 in the Appendix A).
The p-homogeneity of the utility functional leads to the following factorization of J .
Proposition 3.1 There exists a unique càdlàg semimartingale L, called opportunity process,
such that
Lt 1p (Xt (π, c))
p = Jt (π, c) = ess sup
c˜∈A (π,c,t)
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
Us(c˜s) μ◦(ds) |Ft
⎤
⎦ (3.3)
for any admissible strategy (π, c) ∈ A . In particular, LT = DT .
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Proof Although the statement seems to be well known for several special cases of our setting,
we give a detailed proof in view of the importance for this paper. Let (π, c), (πˇ , cˇ) ∈ A and
X := X (π, c), Xˇ := X (πˇ , cˇ). We claim that
1
Xˇ pt
ess sup
c˜∈A (πˇ,cˇ,t)
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
Us(c˜s) μ◦(ds)|Ft
⎤
⎦ = 1
X pt
ess sup
c˜∈A (π,c,t)
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
Us(c˜s) μ◦(ds)|Ft
⎤
⎦ .
(3.4)
Indeed, using the lattice property given in Fact 7.1, we can find a sequence (cn) in A (πˇ, cˇ, t)
such that, with a monotone increasing limit,
X pt
Xˇ pt
ess sup
c˜∈A (πˇ,cˇ,t)
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
Us(c˜s) μ◦(ds) |Ft
⎤
⎦ = X
p
t
Xˇ pt
lim
n
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
Us(cns ) μ
◦(ds) |Ft
⎤
⎦
= lim
n
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
Us
(
Xt
Xˇt
cns
)
μ◦(ds) |Ft
⎤
⎦ ≤ ess sup
c˜∈A (π,c,t)
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
Us(c˜s) μ◦(ds) |Ft
⎤
⎦ ,
where we have used Fact 7.3 in the last step. The claim follows by symmetry. Thus, if we
define Lt := Jt (π, c)/
[
1
p (Xt (π, c))
p
]
, then L does not depend on the choice of (π, c) ∈ A
and inherits the properties of J (π, c) and X (π, c) > 0. unionsq
The opportunity process describes (p times) the maximal amount of conditional expected
utility that can be accumulated on [t, T ] from one unit of wealth. In particular, the value
function (2.5) can be expressed as u(x) = L0 1p x p .
In a Markovian setting, the factorization of the value function (which then replaces the
value process) is very classical; for instance, it can already be found in Merton [19]. In that
setting there is also a number of cases where L is known explicitly for the case without inter-
mediate consumption. See, e.g., Kraft [14] for Heston’s model and Kallsen and Muhle-Karbe
[10] for certain affine models including the CGMY model. For exponential Lévy models an
explicit solution is available also for the case with consumption (see Example 6.1).
Mania and Tevzadze [18] study power utility from terminal wealth in a continuous semi-
martingale model; that paper contains some of the basic notions used here as well. In fact, the
opportunity process is present—in a more or less explicit form—in almost all works dealing
with power utility. However, since it is impossible to discuss here this vast literature, we
confine ourselves to indicating the most closely related references throughout this article.
Remark 3.2 Let D be a martingale with D0 = 1 and ˜P as in Remark 2.2. Bayes’ rule and
(3.3) show that ˜L := L/D can be understood as “opportunity process under ˜P” for the
standard power utility function.
Remark 3.3 We can now formalize the fact that the optimal strategies (in a suitable param-
etrization) do not depend on the current level of wealth, a special feature implied by the
choice of power utility. If (πˆ, cˆ) ∈ A is optimal, ̂X = X (πˆ , cˆ), and κˆ = cˆ/̂X is the optimal
propensity to consume, then (πˆ, κˆ) defines a conditionally optimal strategy for the problem
ess sup
c˜∈A (π,c,t)
E
[∫ T
t
Us(c˜s) μ◦(ds) |Ft
]
; for any (π, c) ∈ A , t ∈ [0, T ].
To see this, fix (π, c) ∈ A and t ∈ [0, T ]. Define the pair (π¯, c¯) by π¯ = π1[0,t]+ πˆ1(t,T ] and
c¯ = c1[0,t] + Xt (π,c)
̂Xt
cˆ1(t,T ] and let X¯ := X (π¯, c¯). Note that (πˆ, cˆ) is conditionally optimal
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in A (πˆ , cˆ, t), as otherwise Fact 7.1 yields a contradiction to the global optimality of (πˆ , cˆ).
Now (3.4) with (πˇ , cˇ) := (πˆ, cˆ) shows that (π¯, c¯) is conditionally optimal in A (π, c, t). The
result follows as c¯/X¯ = cˆ/̂X = κˆ on (t, T ] by Fact 7.3.
The martingale optimality principle of dynamic programming takes the following form
in our setting.
Proposition 3.4 Let (π, c) ∈ A be a strategy such that E[∫ T0 Us(cs) μ◦(ds)] > −∞. Then
the process
Lt 1p (Xt (π, c))
p +
t
∫
0
Us(cs) μ(ds), t ∈ [0, T ]
is a supermartingale; it is a martingale if and only if (π, c) is optimal.
Proof Combine Propositions 3.1 and 7.2. unionsq
The following lemma collects some elementary properties of L . The bounds are obtained
by comparison with no-trade strategies, hence they are independent of the price process. If
D is deterministic or if there are constants k1, k2 > 0 as in (2.4), we obtain bounds which
are model-independent; they depend only on the utility function and the time to maturity.
Lemma 3.5 The opportunity process L is a special semimartingale.
(i) If p ∈ (0, 1), L is a supermartingale satisfying
Lt ≥
(
μ◦[t, T ])−p E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
Ds μ◦(ds) |Ft
⎤
⎦ , 0 ≤ t ≤ T (3.5)
and L , L− > 0. In particular, L ≥ k1 if D ≥ k1.
(ii) If p < 0, L satisfies
0 ≤ Lt ≤
(
μ◦[t, T ])−p E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
Ds μ◦(ds) |Ft
⎤
⎦ , 0 ≤ t ≤ T (3.6)
and in particular Lt ≤ k2 (μ◦[t, T ])1−p if D ≤ k2. In the case without intermediate
consumption, L is a submartingale.
If there exists an optimal strategy (πˆ, cˆ), then L , L− > 0.
Proof Consider the cases where either p > 0, or p < 0 and there is no intermediate con-
sumption. Then π ≡ 0, c ≡ x01{T } is an admissible strategy and Proposition 3.4 shows that
Lt 1p x
p
0 +
∫ t
0 Us(0) μ(ds) = Lt 1p x p0 is a supermartingale, proving the super/submartingale
properties in (i) and (ii).
Let p be arbitrary and assume there is no intermediate consumption. Applying (3.3)
with π ≡ 0 and c ≡ x01{T }, we get Lt 1p x p0 ≥ E[UT (cT )|Ft ] = E[DT |Ft ] 1p x p0 . Hence
Lt ≥ E[DT |Ft ] if p > 0 and Lt ≤ E[DT |Ft ] if p < 0, which corresponds to (3.5) and
(3.6) for this case.
If there is intermediate consumption (and p is arbitrary), we consume at a constant rate
after the fixed time t . That is, we use (3.3) with π ≡ 0 and c = x0(T − t + 1)−11[t,T ] to
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obtain Lt 1p x
p
0 ≥ E
[
∫ T
t Us(cs) μ
◦(ds) |Ft
]
= 1p x p0 (1 + T − t)−p E
[
∫ T
t Ds μ
◦(ds) |Ft
]
.
This ends the proof of (3.5) and (3.6).
In the case p < 0, (3.6) shows that L is dominated by a martingale, hence L is of class
(D) and in particular a special semimartingale.
It remains to prove the positivity. If p > 0, (3.5) shows L > 0 and thus L− > 0 by the
minimum principle for positive supermartingales. If p < 0, let ̂X = X (πˆ, cˆ) be the optimal
wealth process. Clearly L > 0 follows from (3.3) with (πˆ, cˆ). From Proposition 3.4) we have
that 1p ̂X
p L + ∫ Us(cˆs) μ(ds) is a negative martingale, hence ̂X p L is a positive supermar-
tingale. Therefore P[inf0≤t≤T ̂X pt Lt > 0] = 1 and it remains to note that the paths of ̂X p
are P-a.s. bounded because ̂X , ̂X− > 0. unionsq
The following concerns the submartingale property in Lemma 3.5(ii).
Example 3.6 Consider the case with intermediate consumption for D ≡ 1 and S ≡ 1. Then
(πˆ, cˆ) ≡ (0, x0/(1 + T )) is an optimal strategy and Lt = (1 + T − t)1−p is a decreasing
function. In particular, L is not a submartingale.
Remark 3.7 We can also consider the utility maximization problem under constraints in the
following sense. Suppose that for each (ω, t) ∈  × [0, T ] we are given a set Ct (ω) ⊆ Rd .
We assume that each of these sets contains the origin. Then a strategy (π, c) ∈ A is called
C -admissible if πt (ω) ∈ Ct (ω) for all (ω, t), and the set of all these strategies is denoted by
A C . We remark that all results (and their proofs) in this section remain valid if A is replaced
by A C throughout. This generalization is not true for the subsequent section and existence
of an optimal strategy is not guaranteed for general C .
4 Relation to the dual problem
We discuss how the problem dual to utility maximization relates to the opportunity process
L . We assume (2.4) and (2.6) in the entire Sect. 4, hence Proposition 2.3 applies. The dual
problem will be defined on a domain Y introduced below. Since its definition is slightly
cumbersome, we point out that to follow the results in the body of this paper, only two
facts about Y are needed. First, the density process of each martingale measure Q ∈ M S ,
scaled by a certain constant y0, is contained in Y . Second, each element of Y is a positive
supermartingale.
Following [12], the dual problem is
inf
Y∈Y (y0)
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
0
U∗t (Yt ) μ◦(dt)
⎤
⎦ , (4.1)
where y0 := u′(x0) = L0x p−10 and U∗t is the convex conjugate of x → Ut (x),
U∗t (y) := sup
x>0
{Ut (x) − xy} = − 1q yq Dβt . (4.2)
We have denoted by
β := 1
1 − p > 0, q :=
p
p − 1 ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1) (4.3)
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Math Finan Econ (2010) 3:139–159 147
the relative risk tolerance and the exponent conjugate to p, respectively. These constants will
be used very often in the sequel and it is useful to note sign(p) = − sign(q). It remains to
define the domain Y = Y (y0). Let
X = {H • S : H ∈ L(S), H • S is bounded below}
be the set of gains processes from trading. The set of “supermartingale densities” is defined
by
Y ∗ = {Y ≥ 0 càdlàg : Y0 ≤ y0, Y G is a supermartingale for all G ∈ X };
its subset corresponding to probability measures equivalent to P on FT is
Y M = {Y ∈ Y ∗ : Y > 0 is a martingale and Y0 = y0}.
We adopt the setting of [12] by considering the same dual domain Y D ⊆ Y ∗. It consists
of the density processes of (the regular parts of) the finitely additive measures contained in
the σ((L∞)∗, L∞)-closure of the set {YT : Y ∈ Y M } ⊆ L1 ⊆ (L∞)∗. More precisely, we
multiply each density with the constant y0. We refer to [12] for details as the precise con-
struction of Y D is not important here, it is relevant for us only that Y M ⊆ Y D ⊆ Y ∗. In
particular, y0M S ⊆ Y D if we identify measures and their density processes. For notational
reasons, we make the dual domain slightly smaller and let
Y := {Y ∈ Y D : Y > 0}.
By [12, Theorem 3.10] there exists a unique ̂Y = ̂Y (y0) ∈ Y such that the infimum in (4.1)
is attained, and it is related to the optimal consumption cˆ via the marginal utility by
̂Yt = ∂x Ut (x)|x=cˆt = Dt cˆp−1t (4.4)
on the support of μ◦. In the case without intermediate consumption, an existence result was
previously obtained in [15].
Remark 4.1 All the results stated below remain true if we replace Y by {Y ∈ Y ∗ : Y > 0};
i.e., it is not important for our purposes whether we use the dual domain of [12] or the one
of [15]. This is easily verified using the fact that Y D contains all maximal elements of Y ∗
(see [12, Theorem 2.10]). Here Y ∈ Y ∗ is called maximal if Y = Y ′B, for some Y ′ ∈ Y ∗
and some càdlàg nonincreasing process B ∈ [0, 1], implies B ≡ 1.
Proposition 4.2 Let (cˆ, πˆ) ∈ A be an optimal strategy and ̂X = X (πˆ , cˆ). The solution to
the dual problem is given by
̂Y = L̂X p−1.
Proof As LT = DT and cˆT = ̂XT , (4.4) already yields ̂YT = LT ̂X p−1T . Moreover, by
Lemma 8.1 in the Appendix B, ̂Y has the property that
Zt := ̂Yt ̂Xt +
t
∫
0
̂Ys cˆs μ(ds) = ̂Yt ̂Xt + p
t
∫
0
Us(cˆs) μ(ds)
is a martingale. By Proposition 3.4, ˜Zt := Lt ̂X pt + p
∫ t
0 Us(cˆs) μ(ds) is also a martingale.
The terminal values of these martingales coincide, hence ˜Z = Z . We deduce that ̂Y = L̂X p−1
as ̂X > 0. unionsq
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The formula ̂Y = L̂X p−1 could be used to define the opportunity process L . This is the
approach taken in Muhle-Karbe [20] (see also [10]), where utility from terminal wealth is
considered and the opportunity process is used as a tool to verify the optimality of an explicit
candidate solution. From a systematic point of view, our approach via the value process has
the advantage that it immediately yields the properties in Lemma 3.5 and certain monotonicity
results (see Sect. 5).
4.1 The dual opportunity process
Since the function U∗ in the dual problem (4.1) is again homogeneous, we expect a similar
structure as in the primal problem. This is formalized by the dual opportunity process L∗.
Not only is it natural to introduce this object, it also turns out that in certain situations L∗ is
a more convenient tool than L (e.g., [23]). We define for Y ∈ Y and t ∈ [0, T ] the set
Y (Y, t) := {˜Y ∈ Y : ˜Y = Y on [0, t]}
and we recall the constants (4.3) and the standing assumptions (2.4) and (2.6).
Proposition 4.3 There exists a unique càdlàg process L∗, called dual opportunity process,
such that for all Y ∈ Y and t ∈ [0, T ],
− 1q Y qt L∗t = ess inf
˜Y∈Y (Y,t)
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
U∗s (˜Ys) μ◦(ds) |Ft
⎤
⎦ .
An alternative description is
L∗t =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
ess supY∈Y E
[
T
∫
t
Dβs (Ys/Yt )q μ◦(ds) |Ft
]
if q ∈ (0, 1),
ess infY∈Y E
[
T
∫
t
Dβs (Ys/Yt )q μ◦(ds) |Ft
]
if q < 0
and the extrema are attained at Y = ̂Y .
Proof The fork convexity of Y (cf. [12, Theorem 2.10]) shows that if Y, Yˇ ∈ Y and if
˜Y ∈ Y (Yˇ , t), then Y 1[0,t) + (Yt/Yˇt )˜Y 1[t,T ] is in Y (Y, t). It also implies that if A ∈ Ft and
Y 1, Y 2 ∈ Y (Y, t), then Y 11A + Y 21Ac ∈ Y (Y, t). The proof of the first claim is now anal-
ogous to that of Proposition 3.1. The second part follows by using that L∗ does not depend
on Y . unionsq
The process L∗ is related to L by a simple power transformation.
Proposition 4.4 Let β = 11−p . Then L∗ = Lβ .
Proof The martingale property of Zt := ̂Xt ̂Yt +
∫ t
0 cˆs
̂Ys μ(ds) from Lemma 8.1 implies
̂Xt ̂Yt = E[ZT |Ft ]−
∫ t
0 cˆs
̂Ys μ(ds)= E
[
∫ T
t cˆs
̂Ys μ◦(ds) |Ft
]
= E
[
∫ T
t D
β
s
̂Y qs μ◦(ds) |Ft
]
,
where the last equality is obtained by expressing cˆ via (4.4). The right hand side equals ̂Y qt L∗t
by Proposition 4.3; so we have shown ̂X̂Y = ̂Y q L∗. On the other hand, (L̂X p−1)q = ̂Y q by
Proposition 4.2 and this can be written as ̂X̂Y = ̂Y q Lβ . We deduce L∗ = Lβ as ̂Y > 0. unionsq
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4.2 Reverse Hölder inequality and boundedness of L
In this section we study uniform bounds for L in terms of inequalities of reverse Hölder type.
This will yield a corresponding result for the optimal consumption in Sect. 5 as well as a
sufficient condition for (2.5). Moreover, uniform bounds for L are linked to the existence
of bounded solutions for a certain class of backward stochastic differential equations, as
explained in the companion paper [21]. Since bounded solutions are of particular interest in
the theory of those equations, the detailed treatment below is also motivated by this link.
Let q = pp−1 be the exponent conjugate to p. Given a general positive process Y , we
consider the following inequality:
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
T
∫
τ
E
[
(Ys/Yτ )q |Fτ
]
μ◦(ds) ≤ Cq if q < 0,
T
∫
τ
E
[
(Ys/Yτ )q |Fτ
]
μ◦(ds) ≥ Cq if q ∈ (0, 1),
(Rq(P))
for all stopping times 0 ≤ τ ≤ T and some constant Cq > 0 independent of τ . It is useful to
recall that q < 0 corresponds to p ∈ (0, 1) and vice versa.
Without consumption, Rq(P) reduces to E[(YT /Yτ )q |Fτ ] ≤ Cq (resp. “≥”). Inequali-
ties of this type are well known. See, e.g., Doléans-Dade and Meyer [5] for an introduction
or Delbaen et al. [2] and the references therein for some connections to finance. In most
applications, the considered exponent q is greater than one; Rq(P) then takes the form as for
q < 0. We recall once more the standing assumptions (2.4) and (2.6).
Proposition 4.5 The following are equivalent:
(i) The process L is uniformly bounded away from zero and infinity.
(ii) Inequality Rq(P) holds for the dual minimizer ̂Y ∈ Y .
(iii) Inequality Rq(P) holds for some Y ∈ Y .
Proof Under the standing assumption (2.4), a one-sided bound for L always holds by Lemma
3.5, namely L ≥ k1 if p ∈ (0, 1) and L ≤ const. if p < 0.
(i) is equivalent to (ii): We use (2.4) and then Propositions 4.3 and 4.4 to obtain
T
∫
τ
E
[
(̂Ys/̂Yτ )q |Fτ
]
μ◦(ds) = E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
τ
(̂Ys/̂Yτ )q μ◦(ds) |Fτ
⎤
⎦
≤ k−β1 E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
τ
Dβs (̂Ys/̂Yτ )
q μ◦(ds) |Fτ
⎤
⎦
= k−β1 L∗τ = k−β1 Lβτ .
Thus when p ∈ (0, 1) and hence q < 0, Rq(P) for ̂Y is equivalent to an upper bound for L .
For p < 0, we replace k1 by k2.
(iii) implies (i): Assume p ∈ (0, 1). Using Propositions 4.4 and 4.3 and (4.2),
− 1q Y qt Lβt ≤ E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
U∗s (Ys) μ◦(ds) |Ft
⎤
⎦ ≤ − 1q kβ2
T
∫
t
E[Y qs |Ft ]μ◦(ds).
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Hence L ≤ k2C−βq . If p < 0, we obtain L ≥ k1C−βq in the same way. unionsq
If the equivalent conditions of Proposition 4.5 are satisfied, we say that “Rq(P) holds” for
the given financial market model. Although quite frequent in the literature, this condition is
rather restrictive in the sense that it often fails in explicit models that have stochastic dynamics.
For instance, in the affine models of [10], L is an exponentially affine function of a typically
unbounded factor process, in which case Proposition 4.5 implies that Rq(P) fails. Similarly,
L is an exponentially quadratic function of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in the model of
Kim and Omberg [13]. On the other hand, exponential Lévy models have constant dynamics
and here L turns out to be simply a smooth deterministic function (see Example 6.1).
In a given model, it may be hard to check whether Rq(P) holds. Recalling that
y0 M S ⊆ Y , an obvious approach in view of Proposition 4.5(iii) is to choose for Y/y0
the density process of some specific martingale measure. We illustrate this with an essen-
tially classical example.
Example 4.6 Assume that R is a special semimartingale with decomposition
R = α • 〈Rc〉 + M R, (4.5)
where Rc denotes the continuous local martingale part of R, α ∈ L2loc(Rc), and M R is the
local martingale part of R. Suppose that the process
χt :=
t
∫
0
αs d〈Rc〉s αs , t ∈ [0, T ]
is uniformly bounded. Then Z := E(−α • Rc) is a martingale by Novikov’s condition
and the measure Q ≈ P with density d Q/d P = ZT is a local martingale measure for S
as ZE(R) = E(−α • Rc + M R) by Yor’s formula; hence y0 Z ∈ Y . Fix q . Using that
Zq = E(−qα • Rc) exp ( 12 q(q − 1)χ
)
and that E(−qα • Rc) is a martingale by Novikov’s
condition, one readily checks that Z satisfies inequality Rq(P).
If R is continuous, (4.5) is the structure condition of Schweizer [24] and under (2.6) R
is necessarily of this form. Then χ is called mean-variance tradeoff process and Q is the
“minimal” martingale measure. In Itô process models, χ takes the form χt =
∫ t
0 θ

s θs ds,
where θ is the market price of risk process. Thus χ will be bounded whenever θ is.
Remark 4.7 The example also gives a sufficient condition for (2.5). This is of interest only
for p ∈ (0, 1) and we remark that for the case of Itô process models with bounded θ , the
condition corresponds to Karatzas and Shreve [11, Remark 6.3.9].
Indeed, if there exists Y ∈ Y satisfying Rq(P), then with (4.2) and (2.4) it follows that
the value of the dual problem (4.1) is finite, and this suffices for (2.5), as in Kramkov and
Schachermayer [16].
The rest of the section studies the dependence of Rq(P) on q .
Remark 4.8 Let Y satisfy Rq(P) with the constant Cq . If q1 is such that q < q1 < 0 or
0 < q < q1 < 1, then Rq1(P) is satisfied with
Cq1 =
(
μ◦[0, T ])1−q1/q (Cq)q1/q .
Similarly, if q < 0 < q1 < 1, we can take Cq1 = (Cq)q1/q . This follows from Jensen’s
inequality.
There is also a partial converse.
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Lemma 4.9 Let 0 < q < q1 < 1 and let Y > 0 be a supermartingale. If Y satisfies Rq1(P),
it also satisfies Rq(P).
In particular, the following dichotomy holds: Y satisfies either all or none of the inequal-
ities
{
Rq(P), q ∈ (0, 1)
}
.
Proof From Lemma 4.10 stated below we have that
T
∫
t
E
[
(Ys/Yt )q |Ft
]
μ◦(ds) ≥
T
∫
t
(
E
[
(Ys/Yt )q1 |Ft
])
1−q
1−q1 μ◦(ds).
Noting that 1−q1−q1 > 1, we apply Jensen’s inequality to the right-hand side and then use
Rq1(P) to deduce the claim with Cq := (μ◦[t, T ])
q−q1
1−q1 (Cq1)
1−q
1−q1
. The dichotomy follows
by the previous remark. unionsq
For future reference, we state separately the main step of the above proof.
Lemma 4.10 Let Y > 0 be a supermartingale. For fixed 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T , the function
φ : (0, 1) → R+, q → φ(q) :=
(
E
[
(Ys/Yt )q |Ft
]) 1
1−q
is monotone decreasing P-a.s. If in addition Y is a martingale, it also holds that
limq→1− φ(q) = exp
(−E [(Ys/Yt ) log(Ys/Yt ) |Ft
])
P-a.s., where the conditional expec-
tation has values in R ∪ {+∞}.
Proof Suppose first that Y is a martingale; by scaling we may assume E[Y.] = 1. We define
a probability Q ≈ P on Fs by d Q/d P := Ys . With r := (1 − q) ∈ (0, 1) and Bayes’
formula,
φ(q) =
(
Y 1−qt E Q
[
Y q−1s |Ft
]) 1
1−q = Yt
(
E Q
[
(1/Ys)r |Ft
]
) 1
r
.
This is increasing in r by Jensen’s inequality, hence decreasing in q .
Now let Y be a supermartingale. We can decompose it as Yu = Bu Mu, u ∈ [0, s], where
M is a martingale and Bs = 1. That is, Mt = E[Ys |Ft ] and Bt = Yt/E[Ys |Ft ] ≥ 1, by the
supermartingale property. Hence Bq/(q−1)t is decreasing in q ∈ (0, 1). Together with the first
part, it follows that φ(q) = Bq/(q−1)t
(
E
[
(Ms/Mt )q |Ft
]) 1
1−q is decreasing.
Assume again that Y is a martingale. The limit limq→1− log (φ(q)) can be calculated as
lim
q→1−
log
(
E
[
(Ys/Yt )q |Ft
])
1 − q = limq→1− −
E
[
(Ys/Yt )q log(Ys/Yt ) |Ft
]
E [(Ys/Yt )q |Ft ] P-a.s.
using l’Hôpital’s rule and E[(Ys/Yt )|Ft ] = 1. The result follows using monotone and
bounded convergence in the numerator as well as dominated convergence in the denomi-
nator. unionsq
Remark 4.11 The limiting case q = 1 corresponds to the entropic inequality RL log L(P)
which reads
∫ T
τ
E
[
(Ys/Yτ ) log(Ys/Yτ ) |Fτ
]
μ◦(ds) ≤ C1. Lemma 4.10 shows that for a
martingale Y > 0, Rq1(P) with q1 ∈ (0, 1) is weaker than RL log L(P), which, in turn, is
obviously weaker than Rq0(P) with q0 > 1.
A much deeper argument [5, Proposition 5] shows that if Y is a martingale satisfying the
“condition (S)” that k−1Y− ≤ Y ≤ kY− for some k > 0, then Y satisfies Rq0(P) for some
q0 > 1 if and only if it satisfies Rq(P) for some q < 0, and then by Remark 4.8 also Rq1(P)
for all q1 ∈ (0, 1).
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Coming back to the utility maximization problem, we obtain the following dichotomy
from Lemma 4.9 and the implication (iii) ⇒ (ii) in Proposition 4.5.
Corollary 4.12 For the given market model, Rq(P) holds either for all or no values of
q ∈ (0, 1).
We believe that this equivalence of reverse Hölder inequalities is surprising and also of
independent probabilistic interest.
5 Applications
In this section we consider only the case with intermediate consumption. We assume (2.4)
and (2.6). However, we remark that all results except for Proposition 5.4 and Remark 5.5
hold true as soon as there exists an optimal strategy (πˆ, cˆ) ∈ A .
We first show the announced feedback formula for the optimal propensity to consume κˆ ,
which will then allow us to translate the results of the previous sections into economic state-
ments. A special case of the following theorem has previously appeared in [25, Proposition
8], which considers a Markovian model with Itô coefficients driven by a correlated factor.
Theorem 5.1 With β = 11−p we have
cˆt =
(
Dt
Lt
)β
̂Xt and hence κˆt =
(
Dt
Lt
)β
. (5.1)
Proof This follows from Proposition 4.2 via (4.4) and (2.2). unionsq
Remark 5.2 In [21, Theorem 3.2, Remark 3.6] we generalize the formula for κˆ to the utility
maximization problem under constraints as described in Remark 3.7, under the sole assump-
tion that an optimal constrained strategy exists. The proof relies on different techniques and
is beyond the scope of this paper; we merely mention that κˆ is unique also in that setting.
The special case where the constraints set C ⊆ Rd is linear can be deduced from The-
orem 5.1 by redefining the price process S. For instance, one can set S1 ≡ 1 for C =
{(x1, . . . , xd) ∈ Rd : x1 = 0}.
In the remainder of the section we discuss how certain changes in the model and the
discounting process D affect the optimal propensity to consume. This is based on (5.1) and
the relation
1
p x
p
0 Lt = ess sup
c∈A (0,x01{T },t)
E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
t
Ds 1p c
p
s μ
◦(ds) |Ft
⎤
⎦ , (5.2)
which is immediate from Proposition 3.1. In the present non-Markovian setting the param-
etrization by the propensity to consume is crucial as one cannot make statements for “fixed
wealth”. There is no immediate way to infer results about cˆ, except of course for the initial
value cˆ0 = κˆ0x0.
5.1 Variation of the investment opportunities
It is classical in economics to compare two “identical” agents with utility function U , where
only one has access to a stock market. The opportunity to invest in risky assets gives rise to
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two contradictory effects. The presence of risk incites the agent to save cash for the uncer-
tain future; this is the precautionary savings effect and its strength is related to the absolute
prudence P(U ) = −U ′′′/U ′′. On the other hand, the agent may prefer to invest rather
than to consume immediately. This substitution effect is related to the absolute risk aversion
A (U ) = −U ′′/U ′.
Classical economic theory (e.g., Gollier [8, Proposition 74]) states that in a one period
model, the presence of a complete financial market makes the optimal consumption at time
t = 0 smaller if P(U ) ≥ 2A (U ) holds everywhere on (0,∞), and larger if the converse
inequality holds. For power utility, the former condition holds if p < 0 and the latter holds
if p ∈ (0, 1). We go a step further in the comparison by considering two different sets of
constraints, instead of giving no access to the stock market at all (which is the constraint {0}).
Let C and C ′ be set-valued mappings of constraints as in Remark 3.7, and let C ′ ⊆ C in
the sense that C ′t (ω) ⊆ Ct (ω) for all (t, ω). Assume that there exist corresponding optimal
constrained strategies.
Proposition 5.3 Let κˆ and κˆ ′ be the optimal propensities to consume for the constraints
C and C ′, respectively. Then C ′ ⊆ C implies κˆ ≤ κˆ ′ if p > 0 and κˆ ≥ κˆ ′ if p < 0. In
particular, cˆ0 ≤ cˆ′0 if p > 0 and cˆ0 ≥ cˆ′0 if p < 0.
Proof Let L and L ′ be the corresponding opportunity processes; we make use of Remarks 3.7
and 5.2. Consider relation (5.2) with A C instead of A and the analogue for L ′ with A C ′ .
We see that A C ′ ⊆ A C implies 1p L ′ ≤ 1p L , as the supremum is taken over a larger set in
the case of C . By (5.1), κˆ is a decreasing function of L . unionsq
Proposition 5.4 The optimal propensity to consume satisfies
κˆt ≤ (k2/k1)
β
1 + T − t if p ∈ (0, 1) and κˆt ≥
(k2/k1)β
1 + T − t if p < 0.
In particular, we have a model-independent deterministic threshold independent of p in the
standard case D ≡ 1,
κˆt ≤ 11 + T − t if p ∈ (0, 1) and κˆt ≥
1
1 + T − t if p < 0.
Proof This follows from Lemma 3.5 and (5.1). The second part can also be seen as special
case of Proposition 5.3 with constraint set C ′ = {0} since we then have κˆ ′ = (1 + T − t)−1
as in Example 3.6. unionsq
The threshold (1 + T − t)−1 coincides with the optimal propensity to consume for the
log-utility function (cf. [7]), which formally corresponds to p = 0. This suggests that the
threshold is attained by κˆ(p) in the limit p → 0, a result proved in [23].
Remark 5.5 Uniform bounds for κˆ opposite to the ones in Proposition 5.4 exist if and only if
Rq(P) holds for the given financial market model. Quantitatively, if Cq > 0 is the constant
for Rq(P), then
κˆt ≥
(
k2
k1
)β 1
Cq
if p ∈ (0, 1) and κˆt ≤
(
k1
k2
)β 1
Cq
if p < 0.
This follows from (5.1) and (2.4) by (the proof of) Proposition 4.5. In view of Corollary 4.12
we have the following dichotomy: κˆ = κˆ(p) has a uniform upper bound either for all values
of p < 0, or for none of them.
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5.2 Variation of D
We now study how κˆ is affected if we increase D on some time interval [t1, t2). To this end,
let 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T be two fixed points in time and ξ a bounded càdlàg adapted process
which is strictly positive and nonincreasing on [t1, t2). In addition to Ut (x) = Dt 1p x p we
consider the utility random field
U ′t (x) := D′t 1p x p, D′ :=
(
1 + ξ1[t1,t2)
)
D.
As an interpretation, recall the modeling of taxation by D from Remark 2.2. Then we
want to find out how the agent reacts to a temporary change of the tax policy on [t1, t2)—in
particular whether a reduction of the tax rate ρ := D−1/p − 1 stimulates consumption. For
p > 0, the next result shows this to be true during [t1, t2), while the contrary holds before
the policy change and there is no effect after t2. An agent with p < 0 reacts in the opposite
way. Remark 2.2 also suggests other interpretations of the same result.
Proposition 5.6 Let κˆ and κˆ ′ be the optimal propensities to consume for U and U ′, respec-
tively. Then
⎧
⎨
⎩
κˆ ′t < κˆt if t < t1,
κˆ ′t > κˆt if t ∈ [t1, t2),
κˆ ′t = κˆt if t ≥ t2.
Proof Let L and L ′ be the opportunity processes for U and U ′. We consider (5.2) and com-
pare it with its analogue for L ′, where D is replaced by D′. As ξ > 0, we then see that
L ′t > Lt for t < t1; moreover, L ′t = Lt for t ≥ t2. Since ξ is nonincreasing, we also see
that L ′t < (1 + ξt )Lt for t ∈ [t1, t2). It remains to apply (5.1). For t < t1, κˆ ′ = (D′t/L ′t )β =
(Dt/L ′t )β < (Dt/Lt )β = κˆ . For t ∈ [t1, t2) we have
κˆ ′ = (D′t/L ′t )β =
(
(1 + ξt )Dt
L ′t
)β
>
(
(1 + ξt )Dt
(1 + ξt )Lt
)β
= κˆ,
while for t ≥ t2, D′t = Dt implies κˆ ′t = κˆt . unionsq
Remark 5.7 (i) For t2 = T , the statement of Proposition 5.6 remains true if the closed
interval is chosen in the definition of ˜D.
(ii) One can see [25, Proposition 12] as a special case of Proposition 5.6. In our notation,
the authors consider D = 1[0,T )K1 +1{T }K2 for two constants K1, K2 > 0 and obtain
monotonicity of the consumption with respect to the ratio K2/K1. This is proved in a
Markovian setting by a comparison result for PDEs.
6 On the optimal trading strategy
In this section we indicate how the opportunity process L describes the optimal trading strat-
egy πˆ . This issue is thoroughly treated in [21] and our aim here is only to complete the
picture of how the opportunity process describes the power utility maximization problem.
The following holds whenever an optimal strategy (πˆ, κˆ) exists and in particular when the
conditions of Proposition 2.3 are satisfied.
Our description for πˆ is local, i.e., we fix (ω, t) ∈  × [0, T ] and characterize the vector
πˆt (ω) ∈ Rd . We shall see that this vector maximizes a certain concave function g, or more
precisely, a function y → g(ω, t, y) on a subset C 0t (ω) of Rd . Therefore, πˆt (ω) can be seen
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as the optimal control for a deterministic control problem whose admissible controls are
given by the set C 0t (ω):
πˆt (ω) = arg max
y∈C 0t (ω)
g(ω, t, y), (ω, t) ∈  × [0, T ]. (6.1)
The set C 0t (ω) is a local description for the budget constraint, i.e., the condition that the
wealth process X (π, κ) corresponding to some strategy (π, κ) has to be positive.
To formally define C 0t (ω), we first have to introduce the semimartingale characteristics
of R (cf. [9, Chapter II] for background). Let h : Rd → Rd be a cut-off function, i.e., h is
bounded and h(x) = x in a neighborhood of x = 0. Moreover, we fix a suitable increasing
process A and denote by (bR, cR, F R; A) the differential characteristics of R with respect
to A and h. In the special case where R is a Lévy process, one can choose At = t and then
(bR, cR, F R) is the familiar Lévy triplet. In general, the triplet (bR, cR, F R) is stochastic,
but for fixed (ω, t) the interpretation is similar as in the Lévy case. In particular, F Rt (ω) is a
Lévy measure on Rd and describes the jumps of R. With this notation we can define
C 0t (ω) :=
{
y ∈ Rd : F Rt (ω)
{
x ∈ Rd : yx < −1
}
= 0
}
.
This formula is related to the budget constraint because the stochastic exponential X (π, κ) =
x0E (π • R − κ • μ) is nonnegative if and only if the jumps of its argument satisfy πR ≥
−1, and this condition is expressed by the above formula in a local way. We refer to [21,
Sect. 2.4] for a detailed discussion and references to related literature.
It remains to specify the objective function g of the local optimization problem (6.1).
To this end, we consider the Rd × R-valued semimartingale (R, L). We denote by (x, x ′) a
generic point in Rd ×R and by (bR,L , cR,L , F R,L ; A) the joint differential characteristics of
(R, L) with respect to A and the cut-off function given by (x, x ′) → (h(x), x ′); here the last
coordinate does not require a truncation because L is special by Lemma 3.5. Suppressing
(ω, t) in the notation, we can now define
g(y) := L−y
(
bR + cRLL− +
(p−1)
2 c
R y
)
+
∫
Rd×R
x ′yh(x) F R,L(d(x, x ′))
+
∫
Rd×R
(L− + x ′)
{
p−1(1 + yx)p − p−1 − yh(x)
}
F R,L(d(x, x ′)).
One can check (cf. [21, Appendix A]) that y → g(ω, t, y) is a well defined concave function
on C 0t (ω) taking values in the extended real line. With the above notation, and under the
assumption that an optimal strategy (πˆ , κˆ) exists, [21, Theorem 3.2] states that the local
description (6.1) for πˆ holds true P ⊗ A-a.e.
We conclude by an illustration of this result in the Lévy case (see [22] for details).
Example 6.1 Let R be a scalar Lévy process with Lévy triplet (bR, cR, F R) such that R
is neither an increasing nor a decreasing process (then the no-arbitrage condition (2.6) is
satisfied). We assume that the price process S = E(R) is strictly positive, or equivalently
that F R(−∞,−1] = 0. We consider the standard power utility function U (x) = 1p x p and
focus on the case with intermediate consumption for simplicity of notation. For p ∈ (0, 1),
it turns out (see [22, Corollary 3.7]) that our standing assumption (2.5) is satisfied if and
only if
∫ |x |p1{|x |>1} F R(dx) < ∞, and for p < 0 we have seen that (2.5) is always
satisfied.
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The Lévy setting has the particular feature that the opportunity process and the function
g are deterministic. More precisely, we have g(ω, t, y) = Ltg(y) for the deterministic and
time-independent function
g(y) := ybR + (p−1)2 ycR y +
∫
Rd
{
p−1(1 + yx)p − p−1 − yh(x)
}
F R(dx).
Since L is positive, maximizing g is equivalent to maximizing g and so (6.1) can be stated
as
πˆ = arg max
y∈C 0
g(y),
where we note that C 0 is simply a subset of R because F R is deterministic and time-
independent. In particular, the optimal trading strategy πˆ is given by a constant. More-
over, setting a := p1−p maxy∈C 0 g(y), the explicit formula for the opportunity process
is
Lt = a p−1
[
(1 + a)ea(T−t) − 1
]1−p
and then by (5.1) the optimal propensity to consume is
κˆt = 1/L1/(1−p)t = a
[
(1 + a)ea(T−t) − 1
]−1
.
We refer to [22, Theorem 3.2] for the proof and references to related literature.
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Appendix A: Dynamic programming
This appendix collects the facts about dynamic programming which are used in this paper.
Recall the standing assumption (2.5), the set A (π, c, t) from (3.1) and the process J from
(3.2). We begin with the lattice property.
Fact 7.1 Fix (π, c) ∈ A and let t (c˜) := E[
∫ T
t Us(c˜s) μ
◦(ds)|Ft ]. For each t ∈ [0, T ], the
set {t (c˜) : c˜ ∈ A (π, c, t)} is upward filtering.
Indeed, if (π i , ci ) ∈ A (π, c, t), i = 1, 2, we have t (c1)∨t (c2) = t (c3) for the strat-
egy (π3, c3) := (π1, c1)1A + (π2, c2)1Ac with A := {t (c1) > t (c2)}. Clearly (π3, c3) ∈
A (π, c, t). Regarding Remark 3.7, we note that π3 satisfies the constraints if π1 and π2 do.
Proposition 7.2 Let (π, c) ∈ A and
It (π, c) := Jt (π, c) +
t
∫
0
Us(cs) μ(ds).
If E[ |It (π, c)| ] < ∞ for each t, then I (π, c) is a supermartingale having a càdlàg version.
It is a martingale if and only if (π, c) is optimal.
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Proof The technique of proof is well known; see El Karoui and Quenez [6] or Laurent and
Pham [17] for arguments in different contexts.
We fix (π, c) ∈ A as well as 0 ≤ t ≤ u ≤ T and prove the supermartingale property.
Note that It (π, c) = ess supc˜∈A (π,c,t) ϒt (c˜) for the martingale
ϒt (c˜) := E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
0
Us(c˜s) μ◦(ds) |Ft
⎤
⎦ .
(More precisely, the expectation is well defined with values in R ∪ {−∞} by (2.5)).
As ϒu(c˜) = u(c˜)+
∫ u
0 Us(c˜s) μ(ds), Fact 7.1 implies that there exists a sequence (c
n) in
A (π, c, u) such that limn ϒu(cn) = Iu(π, c) P-a.s., where the limit is monotone increasing
in n. We conclude that
E[Iu(π, c)|Ft ] = E[lim
n
ϒu(c
n)|Ft ]
= lim
n
E[ϒu(cn)|Ft ]
≤ ess supc˜∈A (π,c,u) E[ϒu(c˜)|Ft ]
= ess supc˜∈A (π,c,u) ϒt (c˜)
≤ ess supc˜∈A (π,c,t) ϒt (c˜)
= It (π, c).
To construct the càdlàg version, denote by I ′ the process obtained by taking the right
limits of t → It (π, c) =: It through the rational numbers, with I ′T := IT . Since I is a
supermartingale and the filtration satisfies the “usual assumptions”, these limits exist P-a.s.,
I ′ is a (càdlàg) supermartingale, and I ′t ≤ It P-a.s. (see Dellacherie and Meyer [4, IV.1.2]).
But in fact, equality holds here because for all (π˜, c˜) ∈ A (π, c, t) we have
ϒt (c˜) = E
⎡
⎣
T
∫
0
Us(c˜s) dμ◦ |Ft
⎤
⎦ = E[IT (π˜, c˜)|Ft ] = E[IT |Ft ] ≤ I ′t
due to IT = I ′T , and hence also I ′t ≥ ess supc˜∈A (π,c,t) ϒt (c˜) = It . Therefore I ′ is a càdlàg
version of I .
We turn to the martingale property. Let (π, c) be optimal, then we have that I0(π, c) =
ϒ0(π, c) = E[IT (π, c)], so the supermartingale I (π, c) is a martingale. Conversely, this
relation states that (π, c) is optimal, by definition of I (π, c). unionsq
The following property was used in the body of the text.
Fact 7.3 Consider (π, c), (π ′, c′) ∈ A with corresponding wealth processes Xt , X ′t at time
t ∈ [0, T ] and (π ′′, c′′) ∈ A (π ′, c′, t). Then
c1[0,t] + XtX ′t
c′′ 1(t,T ] ∈ A (π, c, t).
Indeed, for the trading strategy π1[0,t] + π ′′1(t,T ], the corresponding wealth process is
X1[0,t] + XtX ′t X
′′1(t,T ] > 0 by (2.1).
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Appendix B: Martingale property of the optimal processes
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a statement which follows from [12] and is known
to its authors, but which we could not find in the literature. For the case without intermediate
consumption, the following is contained in [15, Theorem 2.2].
Lemma 8.1 Assume (2.4) and (2.6). Let (π, c) ∈ A , X = X (π, c) and Y ∈ Y D , then
Zt := Xt Yt +
t
∫
0
csYs μ(ds), t ∈ [0, T ]
is a supermartingale. If (X, c, Y ) = (̂X , cˆ, ̂Y ) are the optimal processes solving the primal
and the dual problem, respectively, then Z is a martingale.
Proof It follows from [12, Theorem 3.10(vi)] that E[ZT ] = E[Z0] for the optimal processes,
so it suffices to prove the first part.
(i) Assume first that Y ∈ Y M , i.e., that Y/Y0 is the density process of a measure Q ≈ P .
As Y M ⊆ Y ∗, the process X + ∫ cu μ(du) = x0 +
∫
X−π d R is a Q-supermartin-
gale, that is, E Q[Xt +
∫ t
0 cu μ(du)|Fs] ≤ Xs +
∫ s
0 cu μ(du) for s ≤ t . We obtain the
claim by Bayes’ rule,
E
[
Xt Yt +
∫ t
s
cuYu μ(du) |Fs
]
≤ XsYs .
(ii) Let Y ∈ Y D be arbitrary, then by [12, Corollary 2.11] there exists a sequence
Y n ∈ Y M which Fatou-converges to Y . Consider also the supermartingale Y ′ :=
lim infn Y n . By Žitkovic´ [28, Lemma 8], Y ′t = Yt P-a.s. for all t in a (dense) subset
 ⊆ [0, T ] which contains T and whose complement is countable. It follows from
Fatou’s lemma and step (i) that Z is a supermartingale on ; indeed, for s ≤ t in ,
E
⎡
⎣Xt Yt +
t
∫
s
cuYu μ(du) |Fs
⎤
⎦ = E
⎡
⎣Xt Y ′t +
t
∫
s
cuY ′u μ(du) |Fs
⎤
⎦
≤ lim inf
n
E
⎡
⎣Xt Y nt +
t
∫
s
cuY nu μ(du) |Fs
⎤
⎦
≤ lim inf
n
XsY ns
= XsYs P-a.s.
We can extend Z | to [0, T ] by taking right limits in  and obtain a right-continuous
supermartingale Z ′ on [0, T ], by right-continuity of the filtration. But Z ′ is indistin-
guishable from Z because Z is also right-continuous. Hence Z is a supermartingale
as claimed. unionsq
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